Department of Philosophy, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, USA
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2018 Aug 5;373(1752). doi: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0135.
A growing body of evidence suggests that cognition is embodied and grounded. Abstract concepts, though, remain a significant theoretical challenge. A number of researchers have proposed that language makes an important contribution to our capacity to acquire and employ concepts, particularly abstract ones. In this essay, I critically examine this suggestion and ultimately defend a version of it. I argue that a successful account of how language augments cognition should emphasize its symbolic properties and incorporate a view of embodiment that recognizes the flexible, multimodal and task-related nature of action, emotion and perception systems. On this view, language is an ontogenetically disruptive cognitive technology that expands our conceptual reach.This article is part of the theme issue 'Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain'.
越来越多的证据表明认知具有体验性和根植性。然而，抽象概念仍然是一个重大的理论挑战。许多研究人员提出，语言对我们获取和运用概念，尤其是抽象概念的能力做出了重要贡献。在本文中，我批判性地考察了这一观点，并最终为之辩护。我认为，一个成功的关于语言如何增强认知的解释应该强调语言的符号属性，并纳入一种体现论，这种体现论承认行动、情感和感知系统的灵活、多模态和任务相关性。从这个角度来看，语言是一种具有个体发生干扰性的认知技术，它扩展了我们的概念范围。本文是“大脑中各种抽象概念：发展、使用和表现”这一主题专刊的一部分。
