Ahlin Jesper
Division of Philosophy, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden.
HEC Forum. 2018 Dec;30(4):361-377. doi: 10.1007/s10730-018-9356-5.
The notion of authenticity, i.e., being "genuine," "real," or "true to oneself," is sometimes held as critical to a person's autonomy, so that inauthenticity prevents the person from making autonomous decisions or leading an autonomous life. It has been pointed out that authenticity is difficult to observe in others. Therefore, judgments of inauthenticity have been found inadequate to underpin paternalistic interventions, among other things. This article delineates what justifies judgments of inauthenticity. It is argued that for persons who wish to live according to the prevailing social and moral standards and desires that are seriously undesirable according to those standards, it is justified to judge that a desire is inauthentic to the extent that it is due to causal factors that are alien to the person and to the extent that it deviates from the person's practical identity. The article contributes to a tradition of thinking about authenticity which is known mainly from Frankfurt and Dworkin, and bridges the gap between theoretical ideals of authenticity and real authenticity-related problems in practical biomedical settings.
真实性的概念，即“真实的”“实在的”或“忠于自己的”，有时被认为对一个人的自主性至关重要，以至于不真实会妨碍一个人做出自主决定或过上自主的生活。有人指出，很难在他人身上观察到真实性。因此，除其他方面外，人们发现对不真实的判断不足以支持家长式干预。本文阐述了对不真实进行判断的依据。有人认为，对于那些希望按照普遍的社会和道德标准生活，而这些欲望根据那些标准是严重不可取的人来说，在某种程度上，当一种欲望是由与该人不相干的因果因素导致的，并且在某种程度上偏离了该人的实际身份时，判断这种欲望是不真实的是合理的。本文为主要从法兰克福和德沃金那里为人所知的关于真实性的思想传统做出了贡献，并弥合了真实性的理论理想与实际生物医学环境中与真实性相关的实际问题之间的差距。
