Kiverstein Julian, Rietveld Erik
Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC), University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
AMC/ILLC/Amsterdam Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
Philosophia (Ramat Gan). 2015;43(3):701-721. doi: 10.1007/s11406-015-9645-z. Epub 2015 Nov 21.
Following a brief reconstruction of Hutto & Satne's paper we focus our critical comments on two issues. First we take up H&S's claim that a non-representational form of ur-intentionality exists that performs essential work in setting the scene for content-involving forms of intentionality. We will take issue with the characterisation that H&S give of this non-representational form of intentionality. Part of our commentary will therefore be aimed at motivating an alternative account of how there can be intentionality without mental content, which we have called skilled intentionality. Skilled intentionality is the individual's selective openness and responsiveness to a rich landscape of affordances. A second issue we take up concerns the distinction between ur-intentionality and content-involving intentionality. We will argue that our notion of skilled intentionality as it is found in humans cuts across these two categories. Instead of distinguishing between different forms of intentionality we recommend focusing on how skilled intentionality takes different forms in different forms of life.
在简要重构了赫托（Hutto）和萨特内（Satne）的论文之后，我们将批判性评论集中在两个问题上。首先，我们探讨赫托和萨特内的主张，即存在一种非表征形式的原初意向性，它在为涉及内容的意向性形式奠定基础方面发挥着至关重要的作用。我们将对赫托和萨特内赋予这种非表征形式意向性的特征提出质疑。因此，我们评论的一部分旨在推动对一种替代解释的探讨，即如何在没有心理内容的情况下存在意向性，我们将其称为技能性意向性。技能性意向性是个体对丰富的可供性景观的选择性开放和响应。我们探讨的第二个问题涉及原初意向性和涉及内容的意向性之间的区别。我们将论证，我们在人类身上发现的技能性意向性概念跨越了这两个类别。我们建议不要区分不同形式的意向性，而是关注技能性意向性在不同生活形式中如何呈现不同的形式。
