Scholten Matthé
Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, Oude Turfmarkt 141-147, 1012 CG Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Philosophia (Ramat Gan). 2016;44(1):205-225. doi: 10.1007/s11406-015-9685-4. Epub 2016 Feb 15.
In this paper, I give a Kantian answer to the question whether and why it would be inappropriate to blame people suffering from mental disorders that fall within the schizophrenia spectrum. I answer this question by reconstructing Kant's account of mental disorder, in particular his explanation of psychotic symptoms. Kant explains these symptoms in terms of various types of cognitive impairment. I show that this explanation is plausible and discuss Kant's claim that the unifying feature of the symptoms is the patient's inability to enter into an exchange of reasons with others. After developing a Kantian Quality of Will Thesis, I analyze some real life cases. Firstly, I argue that delusional patients who are unable to enter into an exchange of epistemic reasons are exempted from doxastic rather than moral responsibility. They are part of the moral community and exonerated from moral blame only if their actions do not express a lack of good will. Secondly, I argue that disorganized patients who are unable to form intentions and to make plans are exempted from moral responsibility because they do not satisfy the conditions for agency.
在本文中，我对下述问题给出了一个康德式的回答：责备患有精神分裂症谱系内精神障碍的人是否不当以及为何不当。我通过重构康德对精神障碍的论述，尤其是他对精神病症状的解释，来回答这个问题。康德从各种认知损伤的角度解释了这些症状。我表明这种解释是合理的，并讨论了康德的如下主张：症状的统一特征在于患者无法与他人进行理由的交流。在提出一个康德式的意志品质论题后，我分析了一些现实生活中的案例。首先，我认为无法进行认知理由交流的妄想症患者可免除信念责任而非道德责任。他们属于道德共同体，只有当他们的行为没有表现出善意的缺失时，才会免除道德责备。其次，我认为无法形成意图和制定计划的紊乱症患者可免除道德责任，因为他们不满足行为主体的条件。
