Huang Pei-Hua
Monash University, Victoria, Australia.
J Med Philos. 2018 Sep 5;43(5):547-567. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhy023.
John Harris recently argued that the moral bioenhancement proposed by Persson and Savulescu can damage moral agency by depriving recipients of their freedom to fall (freedom to make wrongful choices) and therefore should not be pursued. The link Harris makes between moral agency and the freedom to fall, however, implies that all forms of moral enhancement that aim to make the enhancement recipients less likely to "fall," including moral education, are detrimental to moral agency. In this article, I present a new moral agency-based critique against the moral bioenhancement program envisaged by Persson and Savulescu. I argue that the irresistible influences exerted by the bioenhancement program harm our capabilities for conducting accurate self-reflection and forming decisions that truly express our will, subsequently undermining our moral agency.
约翰·哈里斯最近认为,佩尔松和萨夫勒斯库提出的道德生物增强可能会损害道德能动性,因为它剥夺了接受者犯错的自由(做出错误选择的自由),因此不应被推行。然而,哈里斯在道德能动性和犯错自由之间建立的联系意味着,所有旨在使增强接受者不太可能“犯错”的道德增强形式,包括道德教育,都对道德能动性有害。在本文中,我提出了一种基于道德能动性的新批判,针对佩尔松和萨夫勒斯库所设想的道德生物增强计划。我认为,生物增强计划施加的不可抗拒的影响损害了我们进行准确自我反思以及做出真正表达我们意志的决定的能力,从而破坏了我们的道德能动性。