Department of Applied Mathematics, Wentworth Institute of Technology, Boston, MA, 02115, USA.
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, 27402, USA.
Bull Math Biol. 2018 Oct;80(10):2580-2599. doi: 10.1007/s11538-018-0476-5. Epub 2018 Sep 10.
Cholera is an acute gastro-intestinal infection that affects millions of people throughout the world each year, primarily but not exclusively in developing countries. Because of its public health ramifications, considerable mathematical attention has been paid to the disease. Here we consider one neglected aspect of combating cholera: personal participation in anti-cholera interventions. We construct a game-theoretic model of cholera in which individuals choose whether to participate in either vaccination or clean water consumption programs under assumed costs. We find that relying upon individual compliance significantly lowers the incidence of the disease as long as the cost of intervention is sufficiently low, but does not eliminate it. The relative costs of the measures determined whether a population preferentially adopts a single preventative measure or employs the measure with the strongest early adoption.
霍乱是一种急性肠胃感染，每年在全球范围内影响数百万人，主要发生在发展中国家，但也不仅限于发展中国家。由于其对公共卫生的影响，该疾病受到了相当多的数学关注。在这里，我们考虑对抗霍乱的一个被忽视的方面：个人参与抗霍乱干预。我们构建了一个霍乱的博弈论模型，其中个人根据假设的成本选择是否参与疫苗接种或清洁水消费计划。我们发现，只要干预成本足够低，依靠个人的遵守就可以显著降低疾病的发病率，但并不能完全消除它。措施的相对成本决定了人群是优先采取单一预防措施，还是采用早期采用效果最强的措施。
