Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China.
School of Automation and Electrical Engineering, Linyi University, Linyi, 276005, Shandong, China.
Sci Rep. 2018 Nov 5;8(1):16311. doi: 10.1038/s41598-018-33798-w.
For the evacuation crowd of social agents, environment plays a big effect on the behavior and decision of the agents. When facing the uncertain environment, the behavior and decision of agents depend heavily on the perception of environment. Therefore, the cooperation between agents and their perception of environment may coexist during evacuation. Here we establish a mechanism to analyze the coevolution between the cooperation of agents and the perception of environment. In detail, we use a regular square lattice with periodic boundaries, where two payoff matrices are used to describe two kinds of games between neighbors in the safe and dangerous environments. For individual agent, its perception can be adjusted by interacting with neighboring agents. When the environment is generally considered dangerous, the fraction of cooperative agents keeps at a high level, even if the value of b is very large. When all the agents think that the environment is safe, the fraction of cooperation will decrease as the value of b increases.
对于社会代理人的疏散人群，环境对代理人的行为和决策有很大的影响。当面临不确定的环境时，代理人的行为和决策很大程度上取决于对环境的感知。因此，在疏散过程中，代理人之间的合作及其对环境的感知可能会共存。在这里，我们建立了一种机制来分析代理人之间的合作与对环境的感知之间的共同进化。具体来说，我们使用具有周期性边界的规则正方形晶格，其中使用两个收益矩阵来描述安全和危险环境中邻居之间的两种博弈。对于单个代理人，其感知可以通过与邻居代理人的相互作用进行调整。当环境通常被认为是危险的时候，即使 b 的值很大，合作的代理人的比例也会保持在一个较高的水平。当所有的代理人都认为环境是安全的，合作的比例会随着 b 的增加而减少。
