Wang Zhen, Szolnoki Attila, Perc Matjaž
School of Software, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116621, China.
Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Research Centre for Natural Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Post Office Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary.
Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys. 2014 Sep;90(3):032813. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevE.90.032813. Epub 2014 Sep 23.
Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the population adopts either a positive or a negative value of the sucker's payoff, thus playing either the traditional prisoner's dilemma or the snowdrift game. We show that the higher the fraction of the population adopting a different payoff matrix the more the evolution of cooperation is promoted. The microscopic mechanism responsible for this outcome is unique to structured populations, and it is due to the payoff heterogeneity, which spontaneously introduces strong cooperative leaders that give rise to an asymmetric strategy imitation flow in favor of cooperation. We demonstrate that the reported evolutionary outcomes are robust against variations of the interaction network, and they also remain valid if players are allowed to vary which game they play over time. These results corroborate existing evidence in favor of heterogeneity-enhanced network reciprocity, and they reveal how different perceptions of social dilemmas may contribute to their resolution.
鉴于不同参与者对同一社会困境可能有不同的认知，我们在此研究结构化群体中的进化多博弈。核心博弈是弱囚徒困境，群体中有一部分人采用正或负的受骗者收益值，从而分别进行传统囚徒困境博弈或雪堆博弈。我们表明，采用不同收益矩阵的群体比例越高，合作的进化就越能得到促进。导致这一结果的微观机制是结构化群体所特有的，这是由于收益异质性，它自发地引入了强大的合作领导者，从而产生了有利于合作的不对称策略模仿流。我们证明，所报告的进化结果对于互动网络的变化具有鲁棒性，并且如果允许参与者随时间改变他们所进行的博弈，这些结果仍然有效。这些结果证实了支持异质性增强网络互惠性的现有证据，并且揭示了对社会困境的不同认知可能如何有助于解决这些困境。
