1 Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA.
2 Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.
Pers Soc Psychol Bull. 2019 Jul;45(7):1099-1112. doi: 10.1177/0146167218805991. Epub 2018 Nov 17.
When expert advisors have conflicts of interest, disclosure is a common regulatory response. In four experiments (three scenario experiments involving medical contexts, and one field experiment involving financial consequences for both parties), we show that disclosure of a financial or nonfinancial conflict of interest can have a perverse effect on the advisor-advisee relationship. Disclosure, perhaps naturally, decreases an advisee's trust in the advice. But disclosure can also lead to concern that failure to follow advice will be interpreted as a signal of distrust. That is, rejecting the advice could suggest that the advisee is insinuating that the advisor could be biased by the conflict of interest. We show that this insinuation anxiety persists whether the disclosure is voluntary or required by law and whether the disclosed conflict is big or small, but it diminishes when the disclosure is made by an external source rather than directly by the advisor.
当专家顾问存在利益冲突时，披露是一种常见的监管回应。在四项实验中（三项涉及医学背景的情景实验和一项涉及双方财务后果的实地实验），我们表明，披露财务或非财务利益冲突会对顾问-被顾问关系产生负面影响。披露可能会自然而然地降低被顾问对建议的信任。但是，披露也可能导致担心，如果不遵循建议，将会被解释为不信任的信号。也就是说，拒绝建议可能表明被顾问暗示顾问可能受到利益冲突的影响。我们表明，这种暗示焦虑在披露是自愿的还是法律要求的，以及披露的冲突是大是小的情况下都会持续存在，但当披露是由外部来源而不是顾问直接进行时，这种焦虑会减轻。
