Georgetown University.
J Law Med Ethics. 2012 Fall;40(3):482-7. doi: 10.1111/j.1748-720X.2012.00680.x.
The ubiquitous nature of medical conflicts of interest is attracting increased attention from physicians, policymakers, and patients. However, little work has examined the psychological processes at play in the presence of such conflicts. I investigate the subtle influences arising from conflicts of interest that change behavior in both physicians and patients. First, I explore why physicians accept gifts from pharmaceutical companies and medical device manufacturers that appear, to many critics, to be unethical. I review evidence from my published and ongoing research that demonstrates two psychological processes that enable physicians to accept industry gifts: (a) a sense of entitlement and (b) a sense of invulnerability to the biasing effects of conflicts of interest. Second, I investigate the situations that may increase or decrease bias. I find that people, subject to a financial conflict of interest, show greater bias in their advice when they feel less able to identify with the advice-recipient(s). This, perversely, leads to advisors giving more biased advice to groups of people than to one identified individual. Finally, I examine the impact of the conflicted advice on the patient and the success of policies intended to manage such conflicts. Mandatory second opinions and disclosure are often advocated as potential solutions to deal with conflicts of interest. However, both policies have limitations and can sometimes make matters worse. A primary advisor who knows about a second advisor may give even more biased advice since the presence of a second advisor undermines the relationship with the primary advisor. Also, although disclosure of a conflict of interest does have the intended effect of causing patients to trust the advice they receive less, I find that it also has an additional unintended consequence: it creates increased pressure to comply with the (distrusted) advice. This increased pressure occurs because patients want to avoid appearing as though they believe that the (now disclosed) conflict of interest has corrupted their doctors' advice. Thus, instead of being merely a warning, disclosure can become a burdensome request to comply with advice the patient trusts less. These results highlight potential pitfalls that new policies intended to address conflicts of interest should seek to avoid.
利益冲突无处不在,引起了医生、政策制定者和患者的广泛关注。然而,目前很少有研究关注此类冲突背后的心理过程。我研究了利益冲突产生的微妙影响,这些影响会改变医生和患者的行为。首先,我探讨了为什么医生会接受制药公司和医疗器械制造商的礼物,而这些礼物在许多批评者看来是不道德的。我回顾了我已发表和正在进行的研究中的证据,这些证据表明,医生能够接受行业礼物的两个心理过程:(a)一种应得感;(b)一种对利益冲突的偏见影响免疫的感觉。其次,我研究了可能增加或减少偏见的情况。我发现,当人们处于财务利益冲突中时,他们在提供建议时会表现出更大的偏见,因为他们觉得自己与建议接受者的认同感降低。这反而导致顾问向一群人提供的建议比向一个确定的个体提供的建议更有偏见。最后,我研究了这种有冲突的建议对患者的影响,以及旨在管理此类冲突的政策的效果。强制性的第二意见和披露通常被认为是解决利益冲突的潜在方法。然而,这两种政策都有局限性,有时会使情况变得更糟。一个了解第二位顾问的主要顾问可能会提供更有偏见的建议,因为第二位顾问的存在破坏了与主要顾问的关系。此外,尽管披露利益冲突确实有降低患者对所收到建议的信任的预期效果,但我发现它还有一个额外的意外后果:它会增加患者遵守(不信任的)建议的压力。这种压力的增加是因为患者希望避免表现出他们认为(现在披露的)利益冲突已经污染了他们医生的建议。因此,披露不仅是一个警告,它可能成为一个需要患者遵守的负担性建议,而患者对这些建议的信任度更低。这些结果强调了旨在解决利益冲突的新政策应避免的潜在陷阱。