Suppr超能文献

医疗保险强制性捆绑支付计划中医院和市场的全国代表性

National Representativeness Of Hospitals And Markets In Medicare's Mandatory Bundled Payment Program.

机构信息

Joshua M. Liao is associate medical director for contracting and value-based care, director of the UW Medicine Value and Systems Science Lab, and an assistant professor in the Department of Medicine, University of Washington, in Seattle, and an adjunct senior fellow at the Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics, University of Pennsylvania, in Philadelphia.

Ezekiel J. Emanuel is the Diane V. S. Levy and Robert M. Levy University Professor, chair of the Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy, and vice provost for global initiatives, all at the University of Pennsylvania.

出版信息

Health Aff (Millwood). 2019 Jan;38(1):44-53. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.2018.05177.

Abstract

In 2016 Medicare implemented its first mandatory alternative payment model, the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) program, in which the agency pays clinicians and hospitals a fixed amount for services provided in hip and knee replacement surgery episodes. Medicare made CJR mandatory, rather than voluntary, to produce generalizable evidence on what results Medicare might expect if it scaled bundled payment up nationally. However, it is unknown how markets and hospitals in CJR compare to others nationwide, particularly with respect to baseline quality and spending performance and the structural hospital characteristics associated with early savings in CJR. Using data from Medicare, the American Hospital Association, and the Health Resources and Services Administration, we found differences in structural market and hospital characteristics but largely similar baseline hospital episode quality and spending. Our findings suggest that despite heterogeneity in hospital characteristics associated with early savings in CJR, Medicare might nonetheless reasonably expect similar results by scaling CJR up to additional urban markets and increasing total program coverage to areas in which 71 percent of its beneficiaries reside. In contrast, different policy designs may be needed to extend market-level programs to other regions or enable different hospital types to achieve savings from bundled payment reimbursement.

摘要

2016 年,医疗保险开始实施其首个强制性替代支付模式——全面关节置换护理计划(Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement,CJR),根据该计划,医疗机构和医院为髋关节和膝关节置换手术提供的服务收取固定费用。医疗保险将 CJR 定为强制性而非自愿性,目的是为全国范围内捆绑支付的预期结果提供可推广的证据。然而,目前尚不清楚 CJR 中的市场和医院与全国其他地区相比有何不同,特别是在基线质量和支出表现方面,以及与 CJR 早期节省相关的结构性医院特征方面。利用医疗保险、美国医院协会和卫生资源和服务管理局的数据,我们发现了结构性市场和医院特征方面的差异,但医院病例质量和支出的基线情况基本相似。我们的研究结果表明,尽管 CJR 早期节省与医院特征存在异质性,但医疗保险通过将 CJR 扩大到其他城市市场并将计划总覆盖范围扩大到其受益人的 71%所在地区,仍然可以合理地预期类似的结果。相比之下,可能需要不同的政策设计将基于市场的计划扩展到其他地区,或者使不同类型的医院能够通过捆绑支付报销实现节省。

文献检索

告别复杂PubMed语法,用中文像聊天一样搜索,搜遍4000万医学文献。AI智能推荐,让科研检索更轻松。

立即免费搜索

文件翻译

保留排版,准确专业,支持PDF/Word/PPT等文件格式,支持 12+语言互译。

免费翻译文档

深度研究

AI帮你快速写综述,25分钟生成高质量综述,智能提取关键信息,辅助科研写作。

立即免费体验