Instituto ITACA, Universitat Politècnica de València, 46020 Valencia, Spain.
Dipartimento di Ingegneria Civile e Ingegneria Informatica, Università di Roma Tor Vergata, 00133 Rome, Italy.
Sensors (Basel). 2019 Jan 17;19(2):373. doi: 10.3390/s19020373.
A business model for sensor-based services is proposed where a platform creates a multi-sided market. The business model comprises a platform that serves as an intermediary between human users, app developers, and sensor networks, so that the users use the apps and the apps process the data supplied by the sensor networks. The platform, acting as a monopolist, posts a fee for each of the three sides so as to maximize its profit. This business model intends to mimic the market-creating innovation that main mobile apps platforms have generated in the smartphone sector. We conduct an analysis of the profit maximization problem faced by the platform, show that optimum prices exist for any parameter value, and show that these prices always induce an equilibrium in the number of agents from each side that join the platform. We show that the relative strength of the value that advertisers attach to the users determines the platform price structure. Depending on the value of this relative strength, two alternative subsidizing strategies are feasible: to subsidize either the users' subscription or the developers' registration. Finally, all agents benefit from an increase in the population at any of the three sides. This result provides a rationale for incentivizing not only the user participation, but also the entry of developer undertakings and the deployment of wireless sensor network infrastructure.
提出了一种基于传感器的服务的商业模式，其中平台创建了一个多方市场。该商业模式包括一个平台，作为人类用户、应用程序开发人员和传感器网络之间的中介，以便用户使用应用程序，而应用程序则处理传感器网络提供的数据。平台作为垄断者，对三方中的每一方收取费用，以最大化其利润。这种商业模式旨在模仿主要移动应用平台在智能手机领域创造的市场创新。我们分析了平台面临的利润最大化问题，表明对于任何参数值都存在最优价格，并表明这些价格总是会诱使来自每一方的代理数量达到平台上的均衡。我们表明，广告商对用户的重视程度决定了平台的价格结构。根据这个相对强度的值，有两种可行的替代补贴策略：补贴用户的订阅或开发者的注册。最后，三方中任何一方的用户数量增加都会使所有代理受益。这个结果为激励用户参与、开发者进入和无线传感器网络基础设施的部署提供了一个理论依据。
