Grindrod Peter
Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford, United Kingdom.
Netw Neurosci. 2018 Mar 1;2(1):23-40. doi: 10.1162/NETN_a_00030. eCollection 2018.
We consider the implications of the mathematical modeling and analysis of large modular neuron-to-neuron dynamical networks. We explain how the dynamical behavior of relatively small-scale strongly connected networks leads naturally to nonbinary information processing and thus to multiple hypothesis decision-making, even at the very lowest level of the brain's architecture. In turn we build on these ideas to address some aspects of the hard problem of consciousness. These include how feelings might arise within an architecture with a foundational decision-making and classification layer of . We discuss how a proposed "dual hierarchy model," made up from both externally perceived, physical elements of increasing complexity, and internally experienced, mental elements (which we argue are equivalent to feelings), may support aspects of a learning and evolving consciousness. We introduce the idea that a human brain ought to be able to reconjure subjective mental feelings at will, and thus these feelings cannot depend on internal chatter or internal instability-driven activity (patterns). An immediate consequence of this model, grounded in dynamical systems and nonbinary information processing, is that finite human brains must always be learning and forgetting and that any possible subjective internal feeling that might be fully idealized with a countable infinity of facets could never be learned completely a priori by zombies or automata. It may be experienced more and more fully by an evolving human brain (yet never in totality, not even in a lifetime). We argue that, within our model, the mental elements and thus internal modes (feelings) play a role akin to latent variables in processing and decision-making, and thus confer an evolutionary "fast-thinking" advantage.
我们考虑大型模块化神经元到神经元动态网络的数学建模与分析所带来的影响。我们解释了相对小规模的强连通网络的动态行为如何自然地导致非二进制信息处理,进而导致多假设决策,即使是在大脑结构的最底层。反过来,我们基于这些想法来探讨意识难题的一些方面。这些方面包括在具有基础决策和分类层的架构中感觉是如何产生的。我们讨论了一个提出的“双重层次模型”,它由外部感知的、复杂度不断增加的物理元素以及内部体验的心理元素(我们认为等同于感觉)组成,该模型如何支持学习和进化意识的各个方面。我们提出这样的观点,即人类大脑应该能够随意重新唤起主观心理感觉,因此这些感觉不能依赖于内部闲聊或内部不稳定驱动的活动(模式)。基于动态系统和非二进制信息处理的这个模型的一个直接结果是,有限的人类大脑必须始终处于学习和遗忘状态,并且任何可能具有可数无穷多个方面且能被完全理想化的主观内部感觉,僵尸或自动机永远无法先验地完全学会。进化中的人类大脑可能会越来越充分地体验到这种感觉(但永远无法完全体验,即使一生也不行)。我们认为,在我们的模型中,心理元素以及因此的内部模式(感觉)在处理和决策中起着类似于潜在变量的作用,从而赋予进化上的“快速思考”优势。