Khushf George
Department of Philosophy and Center for Bioethics, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, 29208, USA.
HEC Forum. 2019 Jun;31(2):151-166. doi: 10.1007/s10730-019-09371-x.
There is a curious asymmetry in cases where the use of religious language involves a breakdown in communication and leads to a seemingly intractable dispute. Why does the use of religious language in such cases almost always arise on the side of patients and their families, rather than on the side of clinicians or others who work in healthcare settings? I suggest that the intractable disputes arise when patients and their families use religious language to frame their problem and the possibilities of solution. Unlike clinicians, they are not bilingual and thus lack the capacity to understand and negotiate differences in terms that are responsive to those who work in healthcare settings. After considering a representative case, I explore whether an ethics consultant or chaplain can function as a translator and suggest that, at best, such efforts at mediation depend on contingent aspects of a case and will only be partially successful. To appreciate limits on the role for bilingual translators, I consider a futility dispute where a parent using religious language demands that everything be done for a permanently unconscious child. I challenge the traditional interpretation that says the parent values "mere duration of biological life irrespective of quality." From a religious perspective, human life is never "merely biological." This effort to slot the dispute into standard philosophical schemas misses what is crucial in the dispute. I suggest that a better interpretation views the dispute at a meta-level as one about whether withholding and withdrawing care is morally distinguishable from killing. Curiously, this interpretation makes the advocate of futile care into an ally of those "quality of life" advocates who also challenge this distinction. The crux of their dispute now rests on the normative ethics of killing. While I think my interpretation comes much closer to the views of many who demand 'futile care,' I suggest that it still falls short because of the way it reconstructs the religious concerns in nonreligious terms. I close by considering an analogy between the language of suffering and the language of faith, suggesting that both require a much richer understanding of the narratives that orient the lives of patients and their families.
在宗教语言的使用导致沟通障碍并引发看似棘手的争议的案例中,存在一种奇特的不对称性。为什么在这种情况下,宗教语言的使用几乎总是出现在患者及其家属一方,而不是临床医生或其他在医疗环境中工作的人员一方呢?我认为,当患者及其家属用宗教语言来阐述他们的问题及解决问题的可能性时,就会引发这种棘手的争议。与临床医生不同,他们并非具备双语能力,因此缺乏以能让医疗环境中的工作人员理解并协商差异的方式来理解和协商差异的能力。在考虑了一个具有代表性的案例后,我探讨了伦理顾问或牧师是否能充当翻译的角色,并指出,这种调解努力充其量取决于具体案例的偶然因素,而且只会部分成功。为了认识到双语翻译角色的局限性,我考虑了一个关于医疗无效性的争议案例,在这个案例中,一位家长用宗教语言要求为一个永久昏迷的孩子竭尽全力。我对传统解释提出质疑,传统解释认为这位家长看重的是“仅仅是生物生命的延续,而不考虑质量”。从宗教角度来看,人类生命从来都不是“仅仅是生物性的”。这种将争议归入标准哲学模式的做法忽略了争议中的关键所在。我认为,一个更好的解释是,在元层面将争议视为关于停止和撤销治疗在道德上是否有别于杀戮的争议。奇怪的是,这种解释使主张进行无效治疗的人成了那些同样质疑这种区别的“生活质量”倡导者的盟友。他们争议的关键现在在于杀戮的规范伦理学。虽然我认为我的解释更接近许多要求进行“无效治疗”者的观点,但我认为它仍然存在不足,因为它是以非宗教的方式重构宗教关切。最后,我通过思考苦难语言与信仰语言之间的类比来结束本文,表明这两者都需要对引导患者及其家属生活的叙事有更丰富的理解。