Ometov Aleksandr, Bezzateev Sergey, Davydov Vadim, Shchesniak Anna, Masek Pavel, Lohan Elena Simona, Koucheryavy Yevgeni
Tampere University, 33720 Tampere, Finland.
Saint-Petersburg State University of Aerospace Instrumentation (SUAI), St. Petersburg 190000, Russia.
Sensors (Basel). 2019 Apr 3;19(7):1603. doi: 10.3390/s19071603.
Today, the Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) are already in deep integration phase all over the world. One of the most significant enablers for ITS are vehicle positioning and tracking techniques. Worldwide integration of ITS employing Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) and European standard for vehicular communication, known as ETSI ITS-G5, brings a variety of options to improve the positioning in areas where GPS connectivity is lacking precision. Utilization of the ready infrastructure, next-generation cellular 5G networks, and surrounding electronic devices together with conventional positioning techniques could become the solution to improve the overall ITS operation in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication scenario. Nonetheless, effective and secure communication protocols between the vehicle and roadside units should be both analyzed and improved in terms of potential attacks on the transmitted positioning-related data. In particular, said information might be misused or stolen at the infrastructure side conventionally assumed to be trusted. In this paper, we first survey different methods of vehicle positioning, which is followed by an overview of potential attacks on ITS systems. Next, we propose potential improvements allowing mutual authentication between the vehicle and infrastructure aiming at improving positioning data privacy. Finally, we propose a vision on the development and standardization aspects of such systems.
如今,智能交通系统(ITS)在全球已进入深度整合阶段。车辆定位与跟踪技术是ITS最重要的推动因素之一。采用专用短程通信(DSRC)和欧洲车辆通信标准(即ETSI ITS-G5)的ITS全球整合,为改善GPS连接精度不足地区的定位带来了多种选择。利用现成的基础设施、下一代蜂窝5G网络以及周围的电子设备,再结合传统定位技术,可能成为改善车与万物(V2X)通信场景中ITS整体运行的解决方案。尽管如此,就对传输的定位相关数据的潜在攻击而言,车辆与路边单元之间有效的安全通信协议仍需进行分析和改进。特别是,上述信息可能会在传统上被认为可信的基础设施端被滥用或窃取。在本文中,我们首先综述了不同的车辆定位方法,接着概述了对ITS系统的潜在攻击。接下来,我们提出了旨在改善定位数据隐私的车辆与基础设施之间相互认证的潜在改进措施。最后,我们对这类系统的发展和标准化方面提出了展望。