Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK.
Department of Psychology, Franklin & Marshall College, Lancaster, USA.
Cogn Emot. 2020 Mar;34(2):229-241. doi: 10.1080/02699931.2019.1605977. Epub 2019 Apr 15.
Theories that view emotions as being related in some way to moral judgments suggest that condemning moral emotions should, at a minimum, be understood by laypeople to coincide with judgments of moral disapproval. Seven studies (total = 826) tested the extent to which anger and disgust align with this criterion. We observed that while anger is understood to be strongly related to moral disapproval of people's actions and character, disgust is not (Studies 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, and 3), and that, in contexts where disgust expressions are thought to coincide somewhat with moral disapproval, part of the reason is that the expression is perceived as anger (Study 4). Expressions of sadness are also construed as communicating anger in such contexts (Study 5). We discuss our findings in terms of rethinking how we should consider disgust as a moral emotion.
认为情绪在某种程度上与道德判断有关的理论表明,谴责道德情绪至少应该被外行人理解为与道德上的不赞成判断一致。七项研究(总计= 826)检验了愤怒和厌恶是否符合这一标准。我们观察到,虽然愤怒被认为与人们行为和性格的道德不赞成密切相关,但厌恶却不是(研究 1a、1b、2a、2b 和 3),而且在某些情况下,厌恶表情被认为与道德不赞成有些一致,部分原因是该表情被视为愤怒(研究 4)。在这种情况下,悲伤的表情也被认为表达了愤怒(研究 5)。我们根据重新思考应该如何将厌恶视为一种道德情绪来讨论我们的发现。