Policies or knowledge: priors differ between a perceptual and sensorimotor task.

If the brain abstractly represents probability distributions as knowledge, then the modality of a decision, e.g., movement vs. perception, should not matter. If, on the other hand, learned representations are policies, they may be specific to the task where learning takes place. Here, we test this by asking whether a learned spatial prior generalizes from a sensorimotor estimation task to a two-alternative-forced choice (2-Afc) perceptual comparison task. A model and simulation-based analysis revealed that while participants learn prior distribution in the sensorimotor estimation task, measured priors are consistently broader than sensorimotor priors in the 2-Afc task. That the prior does not fully generalize suggests that sensorimotor priors are more like policies than knowledge. In disagreement with standard Bayesian thought, the modality of the decision has a strong influence on the implied prior distributions. We do not know whether the brain represents abstract and generalizable knowledge or task-specific policies that map internal states to actions. We find that learning in a sensorimotor task does not generalize strongly to a perceptual task, suggesting that humans learned policies and did not truly acquire knowledge. Priors differ across tasks, thus casting doubt on the central tenet of many Bayesian models, that the brain's representation of the world is built on generalizable knowledge.