Anderson Mike
School of Psychology & Exercise Science, Murdoch University, Murdoch 6150, Australia.
J Intell. 2017 Jun 9;5(2):24. doi: 10.3390/jintelligence5020024.
In common with most, if not all, papers in this special issue, I will argue that understanding the nature of developmental change and individual differences in intelligence requires a theory of the mechanisms underlying both factors. Insofar as these mechanisms constitute part of the fundamental architecture of cognition, this is also an exercise in unifying the discipline and research on intelligence in both children and adults. However, I argue that a variety of data support a theory suggesting that developmental change is the province of mechanisms commonly regarded as components of executive functioning or cognitive control, whereas individual differences are constrained by the speed of information processing. Perhaps paradoxically, this leads to the conclusion that Binet's fundamental insight-that children's increasing ability to solve problems of increasing difficulty could generate a single scale of intelligence-is wrong. Compounding the paradox, this means that mental age and IQ are not simply two different ways of expressing the same thing, but are related to two different dimensions of g itself.
与本期特刊中多数（即便不是全部）论文一样，我认为，要理解发展变化的本质以及智力方面的个体差异，需要一种关于这两个因素背后机制的理论。鉴于这些机制构成了认知基本架构的一部分，这也是一项统一该学科以及儿童和成人智力研究的工作。然而，我认为各种数据支持这样一种理论，即发展变化属于通常被视为执行功能或认知控制组成部分的机制范畴，而个体差异则受信息处理速度的限制。也许自相矛盾的是，这导致了这样一个结论：比奈的基本观点——儿童解决难度不断增加的问题的能力不断提高能够产生单一的智力量表——是错误的。更矛盾的是，这意味着心理年龄和智商并非仅仅是表达同一事物的两种不同方式，而是与g因素本身的两个不同维度相关。
