Malware Lab, Cyber Security Research Center, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel; Department of Software and Information Systems Engineering, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel.
Malware Lab, Cyber Security Research Center, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel; Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel; Department of Neurobiology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA.
J Biomed Inform. 2019 Jul;95:103233. doi: 10.1016/j.jbi.2019.103233. Epub 2019 Jun 12.
Today, personal medical devices (PMDs) play an increasingly important role in healthcare ecosystems as patient life support equipment. As a result of technological advances, PMDs now encompass many components and functionalities that open the door to a variety of cyber-attacks. In this paper we present a taxonomy of ten widely-used PMDs based on the five diseases they were designed to treat. We also provide a comprehensive survey that covers 17 possible attacks aimed at PMDs, as well as the attacks' building blocks. For each PMD type, we create an ecosystem and data and attack flow diagram, which comprehensively describes the roles and interactions of the players associated with the PMD and presents the most vulnerable vectors and components within the PMDs' ecosystems; such knowledge can increase security awareness among PMD users and their healthcare providers. We also present the basic, yet important, building blocks that constitute the steps by which each of the attacks presented is carried out. Doing so allowed us to establish the foundations for the future development of a novel risk analysis methodology for medical devices. For each attack we mapped the building blocks required to carry out the attack and found that 50% of the attacks rely upon the ability to remotely connect to the PMD, while 61% of them rely on the physical proximity of the attacker to the PMD. Finally, by surveying 21 existing security mechanisms and mapping their coverage for the attacks, we identify the gaps between PMDs' security mechanisms and the possible attacks. We show that current security mechanisms generally fail to provide protection from all of the attacks against PMDs and suggest the development of a comprehensive framework to secure PMDs and protect the patients that rely upon them.
如今,个人医疗设备(PMD)作为患者生命支持设备,在医疗生态系统中发挥着越来越重要的作用。由于技术的进步,PMD 现在包含了许多组件和功能,为各种网络攻击打开了大门。在本文中,我们根据它们设计用于治疗的五种疾病,对十种常用的 PMD 进行了分类。我们还提供了一个全面的调查,涵盖了 17 种可能针对 PMD 的攻击,以及这些攻击的构建模块。对于每种 PMD 类型,我们创建了一个生态系统和数据以及攻击流程图,全面描述了与 PMD 相关的参与者的角色和交互,并展示了 PMD 生态系统中最脆弱的载体和组件;这些知识可以提高 PMD 用户及其医疗服务提供者的安全意识。我们还介绍了构成所提出的每种攻击的执行步骤的基本但重要的构建模块。这样做使我们能够为未来开发一种新的医疗设备风险分析方法奠定基础。对于每种攻击,我们都映射了执行攻击所需的构建模块,并发现 50%的攻击依赖于远程连接到 PMD 的能力,而其中 61%的攻击依赖于攻击者与 PMD 的物理接近程度。最后,通过调查 21 种现有的安全机制并为这些攻击映射它们的覆盖范围,我们确定了 PMD 安全机制和可能的攻击之间的差距。我们表明,当前的安全机制通常无法为所有针对 PMD 的攻击提供保护,并建议开发一个全面的框架来保护 PMD 并保护依赖它们的患者。