School of Medicine, Australian National University, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, Australia.
Institute of Ethics, Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland.
J Med Ethics. 2019 Oct;45(10):673-674. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2019-105670. Epub 2019 Jul 16.
In his recent article, Ben-Moshe offers an account of conscientious objection (CO) in terms of the truth of the underlying moral objections, as judged by the standards of an impartial spectator. He seems to advocate for the view that having a valid moral objection to X is the sole criteria for the instantiation of a right to conscientiously object to X, and seems indifferent to the moral status of the prevailing moral attitudes. I argue that the moral status of the prevailing moral attitudes is relevant, and that a good faith disagreement between those who condone the relevant act and those who object to it is a criterion for CO. In this light, I suggest that CO is a sociopolitical device for managing differing ethical perspectives, particularly in the context of collective moral change. Thus, it is misguided to equate having a valid moral objection with the recognition of a CO.
本-摩西在其最近的文章中，根据公正旁观者的标准，从根本道德异议的真实性角度来解释良心拒绝（CO）。他似乎主张，对 X 有有效的道德异议是对 X 进行 CO 的唯一标准，并且对占主导地位的道德态度的道德地位漠不关心。我认为，占主导地位的道德态度的道德地位是相关的，并且那些宽恕相关行为的人与那些反对它的人之间真诚的分歧是 CO 的一个标准。从这个角度来看，我认为 CO 是一种管理不同伦理观点的社会政治手段，特别是在集体道德变革的背景下。因此，将有效的道德异议等同于 CO 的认可，是错误的。
