Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
School of Health and Social Care, London South Bank University, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Bioethics. 2019 Oct;33(8):965-967. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12646. Epub 2019 Aug 6.
Joona Räsänen has argued that pro-life arguments against the permissibility of infanticide are not persuasive, and fail to show it to be immoral. We responded to Räsänen's arguments, concluding that his critique of pro-life arguments was misplaced. Räsänen has recently replied in 'Why pro-life arguments still are not convincing: A reply to my critics', providing some additional arguments as to why he does not find pro-life arguments against infanticide convincing. Here, we respond briefly to Räsänen's critique of the substance view, and also to his most important claim: that possession of a right to life by an infant does not rule out the permissibility of infanticide. We demonstrate that this claim is unfounded, and conclude that Räsänen has not refuted pro-life arguments against infanticide.
约纳·拉森宁认为,反对允许杀害婴儿的反堕胎论点没有说服力,也未能表明其不道德。我们对拉森宁的论点做出了回应,结论是他对反堕胎论点的批评是错误的。拉森宁最近在《为何反堕胎论点仍然没有说服力:对批评者的回应》中回应了这些观点,提供了一些额外的论点,说明他为何不相信反对杀害婴儿的反堕胎论点。在这里,我们简要回应了拉森宁对实质观点的批评,也回应了他最重要的观点:即婴儿享有生命权并不排除杀害婴儿的可允许性。我们证明了这一观点是没有根据的,并得出结论,拉森宁并没有反驳反对杀害婴儿的反堕胎论点。