Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Canada.
Bioethics. 2019 Oct;33(8):970-972. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12641. Epub 2019 Aug 6.
Ever since medical assistance in dying (MAID) became legal in Canada in 2016, controversy has enveloped the refusal by many faith-based institutions to allow this service on their premises. In a recent article in this journal, Philip and Joshua Shadd have proposed 'changing the conversation' on this issue, reframing it as an exercise not of conscience but of an institutional right of self-governance. This reframing, they claim, will serve to show how health-care institutions may be justified in refusing to provide MAID on moral or religious grounds. I argue that it will not make it easier to justify institutional refusal, and is likely to make it harder.
自 2016 年加拿大的医疗辅助死亡（MAID）合法化以来，许多基于信仰的机构拒绝在其场所提供这项服务，这引发了争议。在本刊最近的一篇文章中，菲利普和约书亚·沙德提出了“改变对此问题的讨论”，将其重新定义为行使机构自治权，而不是行使良心的权利。他们声称，这种重新定义将有助于表明医疗保健机构基于道德或宗教理由拒绝提供 MAID 是合理的。我认为，这并不会使机构拒绝合理化变得更容易，反而可能更难。
