Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, University of Manchester Manchester School of Law, Manchester, UK
J Med Ethics. 2019 Nov;45(11):728-731. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2019-105723. Epub 2019 Aug 31.
In a recent publication, I argued that there is a conceptual difference between artificial womb (AW) technology, capable of facilitating gestation ex utero, and neonatal intensive care, providing incubation to neonates born prematurely. One of the reasons I provided for this distinction was that the subjects of each process are different entities. The subject of the process of gestation ex utero is a unique human entity: a 'gestateling', rather than a fetus or a newborn preterm neonate. Nick Colgrove wrote a response to my paper, claiming that my distinction between the subject of an AW and a newborn (in intensive care) was false. He claims that I have not accounted for the proper definition of 'birth' and that gestatelings are not a distinct product of human reproduction. Further, Colgrove posits that even if I can successfully distinguish gestatelings from preterms, such a distinction is morally irrelevant because the entities would have the same moral status. In this paper, I address the three challenges raised and defend the claim that gestatelings are unique entities. Moreover, I argue that moral status should not be considered ipso facto determinative in the debate about AWs.
在最近的一篇出版物中，我认为人工子宫（AW）技术和新生儿重症监护之间存在概念上的区别，前者能够促进子宫外妊娠，而后者则为早产儿提供孵育。我提出这种区别的原因之一是，每个过程的主体是不同的实体。子宫外妊娠过程的主体是一个独特的人类实体：一个“妊娠体”，而不是胎儿或早产的新生儿。Nick Colgrove 对我的论文做出了回应，声称我在 AW 的主体和新生儿（在重症监护中）之间的区别是错误的。他声称，我没有考虑到“出生”的正确定义，并且妊娠体不是人类生殖的独特产物。此外，Colgrove 假设，即使我能够成功地区分妊娠体和早产儿，这种区别在道德上也是无关紧要的，因为这些实体具有相同的道德地位。在本文中，我将解决提出的三个挑战，并捍卫妊娠体是独特实体的主张。此外，我认为，在关于 AW 的辩论中，不应该将道德地位视为理所当然的决定因素。
