Romanis Elizabeth Chloe
Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, School of Law University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, UK.
Med Law Rev. 2020 Feb 1;28(1):93-123. doi: 10.1093/medlaw/fwz014.
English law is unambiguous that legal personality, and with it all legal rights and protections, is assigned at birth. This rule is regarded as a bright line that is easily and consistently applied. The time has come, however, for the rule to be revisited. This article demonstrates that advances in fetal surgery and (anticipated) artificial wombs do not marry with traditional conceptions of birth and being alive in law. These technologies introduce the possibility of ex utero gestation, and/or temporary existence ex utero, and consequently developing human beings that are novel to the law. Importantly, therefore, the concepts of birth and born alive no longer distinguish between human beings deserving of legal protection in the way originally intended. Thus, there is a need for reform, for a new approach to determining the legal significance of birth and what being legally alive actually encompasses. Investigating the law of birth is of crucial importance, because of the implications of affording or denying the subjects of new reproductive technologies rights and protections. A determination of the legal status of the subject of fetal surgery or an artificial womb will determine what can and cannot be done to each entity. Moreover, the status afforded to these entities will drastically impact on the freedoms of pregnant women.
英国法律明确规定,法律人格以及与之相关的所有法律权利和保护在出生时赋予。这一规则被视为一条易于且始终如一地适用的明确界限。然而,现在是重新审视这一规则的时候了。本文表明,胎儿手术和(预期的)人造子宫的进展与法律上关于出生和存活的传统观念并不相符。这些技术带来了子宫外妊娠和/或子宫外临时存活的可能性,从而产生了法律上全新的发育中的人类。因此,重要的是,出生和活体出生的概念不再以最初设想的方式区分值得法律保护的人类。所以,需要进行改革,需要一种新的方法来确定出生的法律意义以及法律上存活实际涵盖的内容。研究出生法律至关重要,因为这涉及给予或剥夺新生殖技术主体权利和保护的影响。确定胎儿手术或人造子宫主体的法律地位将决定对每个实体可以做什么和不可以做什么。此外,赋予这些实体的地位将极大地影响孕妇的自由。