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官员跨区域调任对中国区域环境质量的影响。

Effects of Officials' Cross-Regional Redeployment on Regional Environmental Quality in China.

机构信息

Business School, Southwest University of Political Science and Law, 401120, Chongqing, China.

Research Center for Economy of Upper Reaches of the Yangtse River, Chongqing Technology and Business University, 400067, Chongqing, China.

出版信息

Environ Manage. 2019 Dec;64(6):757-771. doi: 10.1007/s00267-019-01216-0. Epub 2019 Nov 15.

DOI:10.1007/s00267-019-01216-0
PMID:31732773
Abstract

Cross-regional redeployment (or relocation) of government officials has a significant effect on the local economic development and environmental protection. Based on the panel data of 31 provinces (municipalities) in China from 2001 to 2016 and the environmental pollution index obtained by Entropy method, the dynamic panel regression model was applied to verify the relationship between the officials' cross-regional redeployment and environmental pollution. The results show that environmental pollution was positively correlated with officials' relocation and their tenure after the redeployment. As the officials' tenure increases to the critical value, the positive correlation between the official's tenure and environmental pollution would change. By measuring this threshold, we find that the average critical value for China was 5.14 years, which were the same as the average tenure of Chinese officials. Moreover, the result also illustrates the difference between central eastern China and western China, with the average threshold being 4.01 years and 5.89 years, respectively. In addition, the impact of officials' cross-regional redeployment on the environment would also be affected by the initial condition of the region. According to the result, the environmental governance within the central eastern regions was better than that in the western region. In the last part of this paper, we proposed measures and suggestions, such as changing the incentive policies of officials, perfecting the local policies and the cultivate and exchange system of cadres, as well as strengthen the power of social supervision, for the sake of facilitating the healthy and green development of the regional economy.

摘要

官员跨区域调动(或迁移)对当地经济发展和环境保护有重大影响。基于 2001 年至 2016 年中国 31 个省(市)的面板数据和熵值法得到的环境污染指数,应用动态面板回归模型验证了官员跨区域调动与环境污染之间的关系。结果表明,环境污染与官员调动及其调动后的任期呈正相关。随着官员任期增加到临界值,官员任期与环境污染之间的正相关性将发生变化。通过测量这个阈值,我们发现中国的平均临界值为 5.14 年,与中国官员的平均任期相同。此外,结果还说明了中东部和西部地区之间的差异,平均阈值分别为 4.01 年和 5.89 年。此外,官员跨区域调动对环境的影响也会受到区域初始条件的影响。根据结果,中东部地区的环境治理要好于西部地区。在本文的最后一部分,我们提出了一些措施和建议,如改变官员的激励政策、完善地方政策和干部培养交流制度,以及加强社会监督的权力,以促进区域经济的健康和绿色发展。

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Official promotion and extreme environmental regulation: Evidence from prefecture-level cities in China.官方推动与极端环境规制:来自中国地级市的证据。
Front Public Health. 2022 Nov 25;10:1029869. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2022.1029869. eCollection 2022.
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Official tenure and governance effectiveness of China's basic pension insurance system: An inverted U-shaped curve.中国基本养老保险制度的官方任期与治理有效性:倒 U 型曲线。
Front Public Health. 2022 Sep 20;10:975459. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2022.975459. eCollection 2022.
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How Has China Structured Its Ecological Governance Policy System?-A Case from Fujian Province.
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A Study on the Mechanism and Strategy of Cross-Regional Emergency Cooperation for Natural Disasters in China-Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory.中国自然灾害跨区域应急协同的机制与策略研究——基于演化博弈论的视角。
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