School of Economics and Management, China University of Geosciences (Beijing), Beijing, China.
J Environ Manage. 2020 Sep 1;269:110632. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2020.110632. Epub 2020 May 21.
China has witnessed a drop in the speed of its economic development from 14% to 6% since 2007. The literature has attributed "the miracle of China's economic growth" over the past four decades to the compatibility of political incentives and fiscal incentives. However, as the central government shifts its priorities from "development is the last word" to "lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets", can local officials' political and financial incentives still achieve incentive compatibility? Theoretically and empirically, this paper examines the impact of the compatibility of political and financial incentives on local governments' environmental governance in different stages. We find that environmental performance has consistently been an important political promotion incentive for officials, especially after 2007. We also find that officials in cities with incentive compatibility have no promotion advantages over their opponents because incentive compatibility restrained the development of the manufacturing industry, leading to a suppression of the economic growth rate. Local governments sacrifice a certain economic growth rate - in other words, local fiscal revenue - in exchange for environmental quality improvements and adopt strategic actions to cater to the central government's new performance evaluation system, which focuses mainly on environmental protection assessment through strategic behavior.
自 2007 年以来，中国经济发展速度已从 14%降至 6%。文献将过去四十年“中国经济增长奇迹”归因于政治激励和财政激励的兼容性。然而，随着中央政府将重点从“发展是硬道理”转变为“绿水青山就是金山银山”，地方官员的政治和财政激励是否仍然具有激励相容性？本文从理论和实证两个方面考察了政治和财政激励相容对地方政府不同阶段环境治理的影响。我们发现，环境绩效一直是官员晋升的一个重要政治激励因素，尤其是在 2007 年之后。我们还发现，在具有激励相容性的城市，官员并没有比对手获得晋升优势，因为激励相容性限制了制造业的发展，从而抑制了经济增长率。地方政府牺牲一定的经济增长率——换句话说，牺牲地方财政收入——以换取环境质量的改善，并通过战略行动来迎合中央政府新的以环境保护评估为主的绩效评估体系，这是一种战略性的行为。
