Gasper Karen, Spencer Lauren A, Hu Danfei
Department of Psychology, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, United States.
Front Psychol. 2019 Nov 8;10:2476. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02476. eCollection 2019.
Researchers interested in affect have often questioned the existence of neutral affective states. In this paper, we review and challenge three beliefs that researchers might hold about neutral affect. These beliefs are: (1) it is not possible to feel neutral because people are always feeling something, (2) neutrality is not an affective state because affect must be positively or negatively valenced, and (3) neutral affect is unimportant because it does not influence cognition or behavior. We review the reasons these beliefs might exist and provide empirical evidence that questions them. Specifically, we argue that neutral affect is a felt experience that provides important valence-relevant information, which influences cognition and behavior. By dispelling these beliefs about neutral affect, we hope to shine a light on the assumptions that researchers hold about the nature of affect and to provide novel theoretical and methodological perspectives that help advance our understanding of the affective landscape.
对情感感兴趣的研究人员常常质疑中性情感状态的存在。在本文中,我们回顾并质疑了研究人员可能持有的关于中性情感的三种观点。这些观点是:(1)不可能感到中性,因为人们总是在感受着某种东西;(2)中性不是一种情感状态,因为情感必须具有正性或负性效价;(3)中性情感不重要,因为它不影响认知或行为。我们回顾了这些观点可能存在的原因,并提供了对其提出质疑的实证证据。具体而言,我们认为中性情感是一种能提供重要的与效价相关信息的感受体验,它会影响认知和行为。通过消除这些关于中性情感的观点,我们希望揭示研究人员对情感本质所秉持的假设,并提供新颖的理论和方法论视角,以帮助推进我们对情感领域的理解。