Hommel Bernhard
Cognitive Psychology Unit, Institute of Psychology, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands.
Front Psychol. 2019 Nov 14;10:2542. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02542. eCollection 2019.
Everyday thinking and scientific theorizing about human action control are equally driven by the apparently obvious contrast between will and habit or, in their more modern disguise: intentional and automatic processes, and model-based and model-free action planning. And yet, no comprehensive category system to systematically tell truly willed from merely habitual actions is available. As I argue, this is because the contrast is ill-conceived, because almost every single action is both willed and habitual, intentional and automatic, and model-based and model-free, simply because will and habit (and their successors) do not refer to alternative modes or pathways of action control but rather to different phases of action planning. I further discuss three basic misconceptions about action control that binary theorizing relies on: the assumption that intentional processes compete with automatic processes (rather than the former setting the stage for the latter), the assumption that action control is targeting processes (rather than representations of action outcomes), and the assumption that people follow only one goal at a time (rather than multiple goals). I conclude that (at least the present style of) binary theorizing fails to account for action control and should thus be replaced by a more integrative view.
关于人类行动控制的日常思考和科学理论化，同样受到意志与习惯之间明显对比的驱动，或者在其更现代的伪装下：有意和自动过程，以及基于模型和无模型的行动规划。然而，目前还没有一个全面的分类系统来系统地区分真正出于意志的行动和仅仅是习惯性的行动。正如我所论证的，这是因为这种对比是错误构想的，因为几乎每一个行动既是出于意志的又是习惯性的，既是有意的又是自动的，既是基于模型的又是无模型的，仅仅是因为意志和习惯（及其后继者）并非指行动控制的替代模式或途径，而是指行动规划的不同阶段。我进一步讨论了二元理论所依赖的关于行动控制的三个基本误解：有意过程与自动过程相互竞争的假设（而不是前者为后者奠定基础）、行动控制针对过程的假设（而不是行动结果的表征）以及人们一次只追求一个目标的假设（而不是多个目标）。我得出结论，二元理论（至少是目前的形式）无法解释行动控制，因此应该被更综合的观点所取代。
