Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK.
Med Health Care Philos. 2020 Jun;23(2):321-323. doi: 10.1007/s11019-019-09936-0.
Joona Räsänen has proposed a concept he calls Schrödinger's Fetus as a solution to reconciling what he believes are two widely held but contradictory intuitions. I show that Elizabeth Harman's Actual Future Principle, upon which Schrödinger's Fetus is based, uses a more convincing account of personhood. I also argue that both Räsänen and Harman, by embracing animalism, weaken their arguments by allowing Don Marquis' 'future like ours' argument for the immorality of abortion into the frame.
约纳·拉森宁提出了一个他称之为薛定谔的胎儿的概念，作为调和他认为是两种广泛持有的但相互矛盾的直觉的一种解决方案。我表明，薛定谔的胎儿所依据的伊丽莎白·哈曼的实际未来原则，使用了一种更令人信服的人格概念。我还认为，拉森宁和哈曼通过接受动物主义，允许唐·马奎尔的“与我们相似的未来”论证堕胎的不道德性进入框架，从而削弱了他们的论点。
