Räsänen Joona
Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Arts and Ideas, Faculty of Humanities, University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1020, Blindern, 0315, Oslo, Norway.
Med Health Care Philos. 2020 Mar;23(1):125-130. doi: 10.1007/s11019-019-09916-4.
This paper defends and develops Elizabeth Harman's Actual Future Principle with a concept called Schrödinger's Fetus. I argue that all early fetuses are Schrödinger's Fetuses: those early fetuses that survive and become conscious beings have full moral status already as early fetuses, but those fetuses that die as early fetuses lack moral status. With Schrödinger's Fetus, it becomes possible to accept two widely held but contradictory intuitions to be true, and to avoid certain reductiones ad absurdum that pro-life and pro-choice positions face. It also gives a simple solution to the problem of prenatal harm.
本文借助“薛定谔式胎儿”这一概念为伊丽莎白·哈曼的“实际未来原则”进行辩护与拓展。我认为所有早期胎儿都是薛定谔式胎儿：那些存活下来并成为有意识个体的早期胎儿，在其还是早期胎儿时就已然拥有完全的道德地位，但那些作为早期胎儿就死亡的胎儿则缺乏道德地位。有了薛定谔式胎儿这一概念，就有可能接受两种被广泛持有但相互矛盾的直觉为真，并避免支持生命和支持选择立场面临的某些归谬法。它还为产前伤害问题提供了一个简单的解决方案。
