人格实体观的解释力。
The explanatory power of the substance view of persons.
作者信息
Beckwith Francis J
机构信息
J.M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, Baylor Univesity, P.O. Box 97308, Waco, TX 76798-7308, USA.
出版信息
Christ Bioeth. 2004 Jan-Apr;10(1):33-54. doi: 10.1080/13803600490489861.
The purpose of this essay is to offer support for the substance view of persons, the philosophical anthropology defended by Patrick Lee in his essay. In order to accomplish this the author (1) presents a brief definition of the substance view; (2) argues that the substance view has more explanatory power in accounting for why we believe that human persons are intrinsically valuable even when they are not functioning as such (e.g., when on is temporarily comatose), why human persons remain identical to themselves over time, and why it follows from these points that the unborn are human persons; and (3) responds to two arguments that attempt to establish the claim that the early human being is not a unified substance until at least fourteen days after conception.
本文的目的是为“人是实体”这一观点提供支持，这是帕特里克·李在其文章中所捍卫的哲学人类学观点。为了实现这一目标，作者：（1）对“人是实体”这一观点给出简要定义；（2）论证“人是实体”这一观点在解释以下问题时具有更强的解释力：为何我们认为即使人类个体没有发挥其功能（例如，处于暂时昏迷状态时），他们本质上依然具有价值；为何人类个体在时间推移中保持自身同一性；以及基于这些观点为何可以得出未出生者也是人类个体的结论；（3）回应了两个试图证明早期人类至少在受孕后十四天之前并非统一实体这一主张的论证。
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