Polák Michal, Marvan Tomáš
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, University of West Bohemia, Pilsen, Czechia.
Department of Analytic Philosophy, The Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy, Prague, Czechia.
Front Psychol. 2019 Dec 17;10:2837. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02837. eCollection 2019.
In this paper, we propose the following hypothesis: the hard problem of consciousness is in part an artifact of what we call the unitary approach to phenomenal consciousness. The defining mark of the unitary approach is that it views consciousness and phenomenality as inseparable. Giving up this conceptual commitment redefines, in a productive way, the explanatory tasks of the theory of consciousness. Adopting a non-unitary conception of experience does not make the hard problem of consciousness go away completely but it shifts the locus of where the explanation of experience gets difficult, and cuts down the mystery of consciousness to size. Other advantages of the non-unitary account of consciousness are sketched as well.
在本文中,我们提出以下假设:意识的难题在一定程度上是我们所谓的现象意识一元论方法的产物。一元论方法的决定性标志在于它将意识与现象性视为不可分割的。放弃这一概念上的承诺以一种富有成效的方式重新定义了意识理论的解释任务。采用非一元的经验概念并不会使意识难题完全消失,但它转移了经验解释变得困难的位置,并将意识的神秘性缩小到一定程度。本文还概述了意识非一元论解释的其他优点。