Räsänen Joona
Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway.
Bioethics. 2020 Oct;34(8):862-864. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12720. Epub 2020 Feb 3.
In an article of this journal, Perry Hendricks makes a novel argument for the immorality of abortion. According to his impairment argument, abortion is immoral because: (a) it is wrong to impair a fetus to the nth degree, such as causing the fetus to have fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS); (b) it is wrong to impair a fetus to the n+1 degree (to cause the fetus to be more impaired than to have FAS); (c) killing the fetus impairs the fetus to the n+1 degree (causes it to be more impaired than to have FAS); (d) abortion kills the fetus; (e) therefore, abortion is immoral. The impairment argument is a promising account for the wrongness of abortion because it does not rely on the controversial metaphysical premise that a fetus is a person. This article aims to show, that despite some immediate advantages over the rival theories of the immorality of abortion there is a reason to believe that the impairment argument is untenable. That is because there are goods that can be achieved by abortion but that cannot be achieved by impairing the fetus.
在本期刊的一篇文章中，佩里·亨德里克斯就堕胎的不道德性提出了一个新颖的论点。根据他的损害论证，堕胎是不道德的，因为：（a）将胎儿损害到第n程度是错误的，比如导致胎儿患有胎儿酒精综合征（FAS）；（b）将胎儿损害到第n + 1程度（导致胎儿比患有FAS时受到更严重的损害）是错误的；（c）杀死胎儿会将胎儿损害到第n + 1程度（使其比患有FAS时受到更严重的损害）；（d）堕胎会杀死胎儿；（e）因此，堕胎是不道德的。损害论证是关于堕胎错误性的一个有前景的解释，因为它不依赖于胎儿是人的有争议的形而上学前提。本文旨在表明，尽管与关于堕胎不道德性的其他竞争理论相比有一些直接优势，但有理由相信损害论证是站不住脚的。这是因为存在一些通过堕胎可以实现但通过损害胎儿无法实现的益处。
