Blackshaw Bruce Philip, Hendricks Perry
Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Purdue University Department of Philosophy, West Lafayette, Indiana, USA.
J Med Ethics. 2020 Jun 5;47(7):515-8. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2020-106153.
Perry Hendricks' for the immorality of abortion is based on two premises: first, impairing a fetus with fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) is immoral, and second, if impairing an organism to some degree is immoral, then impairing it to a higher degree is also immoral. He calls this (TIP). Since abortion impairs a fetus to a higher degree than FAS, it follows from these two premises that abortion is immoral. Critics have focussed on the clause of TIP, which requires that the relevant details surrounding each impairment be sufficiently similar. In this article, we show that the clause is superfluous, and by replacing it with a more restrictive condition, the impairment argument is considerably strengthened.
佩里·亨德里克斯关于堕胎不道德的观点基于两个前提:第一,因胎儿酒精综合征(FAS)损害胎儿是不道德的;第二,如果在某种程度上损害一个有机体是不道德的,那么在更高程度上损害它也是不道德的。他将此称为(TIP)。由于堕胎对胎儿的损害程度高于FAS,从这两个前提可以得出堕胎是不道德的结论。批评者们聚焦于TIP的一致性条款,该条款要求每种损害周围的相关细节要足够相似。在本文中,我们表明一致性条款是多余的,通过用一个更具限制性的条件取代它,损害论证得到了显著加强。