Department of Philosophy, State University of New York at Fredonia, Fredonia, NY, 14063, USA.
Theor Med Bioeth. 2020 Feb;41(1):39-52. doi: 10.1007/s11017-020-09516-x.
Jerome Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) of medical disorder is an influential hybrid of naturalist and normative theories. In order to conclude that a condition is a disorder, according to the HDA, one must determine both that it results from a failure of a physical or psychological mechanism to perform its natural function and that it is harmful. In a recent issue of this journal, I argued that the HDA entails implausible judgments about which disorders there are and how they are individuated. The same arguments apply to other views that incorporate a harm criterion. More recently, David G. Limbaugh has modified the HDA by providing a novel account of the way in which a disorder must be harmful. Here, I briefly review the relevant issues and then critically assess Limbaugh's account. I argue in the end that Limbaugh's revisions do not succeed in making accounts like the HDA more attractive.
杰罗姆·韦克菲尔德对医学障碍的有害功能障碍分析（HDA）是自然主义和规范理论的有影响力的混合体。根据 HDA 的说法，要确定一种情况是否为障碍，必须确定它是否是由于身体或心理机制未能发挥其自然功能以及它是否有害。在本刊最近的一期中，我认为 HDA 对存在哪些障碍以及如何对其进行个体化的判断是不合理的。同样的论点也适用于其他包含危害标准的观点。最近，大卫·G·林博通过提供一种新颖的方式来解释障碍必须是有害的，从而修改了 HDA。在这里，我简要回顾了相关问题，然后批判性地评估了林博的说法。我认为，最终，林博的修订并没有成功地使 HDA 等说法更具吸引力。
