Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin, Turin, Italy.
Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, CNR, Rome, Rome, Italy.
PLoS One. 2020 Feb 7;15(2):e0228285. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0228285. eCollection 2020.
Will fights erupt when resources are scarce and the rules regulating their distribution are absent or ignored? We conjecture that the answer depends on whether credible information about individuals' toughness is available. When people send credible signs and signals of their toughness disputes may be solved without violence. We use a laboratory experiment in which subjects create information about their toughness and decide whether to take others' resources and resist in case others' attempt to take theirs. Subjects perform a potentially painful but safe physical exercise to create information and to determine who wins and loses fights. This, realistically, ranks subjects according to their toughness and implicates toughness, a quality important in real conflict, in fighting. We find that, consistent with theory, information reduces fighting. This suggests that, in addition to the theories traditionally used to explain prisoner behavior, the availability of credible information about toughness influences prison conflict.
当资源稀缺且缺乏或无视分配规则时，是否会爆发冲突？我们推测，答案取决于是否有关于个人韧性的可信信息。当人们发出自己韧性的可信信号和迹象时，争端可能无需通过暴力就能解决。我们采用了实验室实验的方法，实验中，主体会创建关于自己韧性的信息，并决定是否要拿走他人的资源，以及在他人试图拿走自己资源时进行抵抗。主体会进行一项可能会带来痛苦但安全的身体锻炼，以创建信息并确定谁在争斗中获胜和失败。这实际上是根据主体的韧性对其进行排名，并将在现实冲突中很重要的韧性这一品质纳入到争斗中。我们发现，与理论一致，信息减少了争斗。这表明，除了传统上用于解释囚徒行为的理论之外，关于韧性的可信信息的可用性也会影响监狱冲突。
