West China Hospital, Sichuan University, Sichuan, China; School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Sichuan, China.
School of Economics Mathematics, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Sichuan, China.
Environ Res. 2020 May;184:109356. doi: 10.1016/j.envres.2020.109356. Epub 2020 Mar 14.
This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain with a supplier and a retailer both having capital constraints. The capital-constrained retailer first applies for loans from the commercial bank, and then applies for trade credit from the supplier. Compared with the single trade credit financing mechanism, what are the similarities and differences in the contagion and evolution of the associated credit risk in the supply chain when the retailer adopts both trade credit and bank credit (dual-channel financing) mechanism. Based on Stackelberg game analysis framework of the supplier and retailer, this paper clarifies the contagion mechanism of the associated credit risk in the supply chain and discusses the influences of financing structure, financing channel and financing costs on the contagion effect of the associated credit risk in the supply chain under dual-channel financing mechanism. Combined with the case simulation analysis, it is found that: Compared with the single trade credit financing mechanism, the contagion effect is weaker under the dual-channel financing mechanism. The financing structure significantly affects the contagion effect, which increases with the increase of the proportion of trade credit financing. Both bank credit and trade credit financing costs can positively affect the contagion effect. Our research can enrich the existing credit risk management and supply chain finance literature and provide decision support for the selection of financing methods and risk control of commercial banks and supply chain enterprises.
本文考虑了一个由供应商和零售商组成的两级供应链，两者都存在资金约束。资本约束型零售商首先向商业银行申请贷款，然后向供应商申请贸易信贷。与单一的贸易信贷融资机制相比，零售商采用贸易信贷和银行信贷（双渠道融资）机制时，供应链中相关信用风险的传播和演变有哪些相似之处和不同之处。本文基于供应商和零售商的 Stackelberg 博弈分析框架，阐明了供应链中相关信用风险的传播机制，并讨论了融资结构、融资渠道和融资成本对双渠道融资机制下供应链中相关信用风险传播效应的影响。结合案例仿真分析，发现：与单一的贸易信贷融资机制相比，双渠道融资机制下的传播效应较弱。融资结构对传播效应有显著影响，随着贸易信贷融资比例的增加而增加。银行信贷和贸易信贷融资成本均可正向影响传播效应。我们的研究可以丰富现有信用风险管理和供应链金融文献，为商业银行和供应链企业融资方式选择和风险控制提供决策支持。
