Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security; Assistant Professor, Department of Environmental Health and Engineering, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.
Office of Applied Research, Center for Preparedness and Response, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Disaster Med Public Health Prep. 2021 Oct;15(5):551-556. doi: 10.1017/dmp.2020.45. Epub 2020 Apr 20.
This article describes implementation considerations for Ebola-related monitoring and movement restriction policies in the United States during the 2013-2016 West Africa Ebola epidemic.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted between January and May 2017 with 30 individuals with direct knowledge of state-level Ebola policy development and implementation processes. Individuals represented 17 jurisdictions with variation in adherence to US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines, census region, predominant state political affiliation, and public health governance structures, as well as the CDC.
Interviewees reported substantial resource commitments required to implement Ebola monitoring and movement restriction policies. Movement restriction policies, including for quarantine, varied from voluntary to mandatory programs, and, occasionally, quarantine enforcement procedures lacked clarity.
Efforts to improve future monitoring and movement restriction policies may include addressing surge capacity to implement these programs, protocols for providing support to affected individuals, coordination with law enforcement, and guidance on varying approaches to movement restrictions.
本文描述了 2013-2016 年西非埃博拉疫情期间美国实施与埃博拉相关的监测和行动限制政策的注意事项。
2017 年 1 月至 5 月期间，对 30 名直接了解州一级埃博拉政策制定和实施过程的人员进行了半结构化访谈。这些人员代表了 17 个司法管辖区，其对美国疾病控制与预防中心（CDC）指南、人口普查区域、主要州政治派别、公共卫生治理结构以及疾病预防控制中心的遵守情况存在差异。
受访者报告说，实施埃博拉监测和行动限制政策需要大量资源投入。行动限制政策，包括检疫，从自愿到强制的计划不等，并且，有时，检疫执行程序缺乏明确性。
为改进未来的监测和行动限制政策，可能需要解决实施这些计划的应急能力、为受影响个人提供支持的协议、与执法部门的协调以及对不同行动限制方法的指导。
