Baetu Tudor M
Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, Département de Philosophie et des Arts, 3351, boul. des Forges, Trois-Rivières, Québec, G8Z 4M3, Canada.
Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci. 2020 Aug;82:101292. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2020.101292. Epub 2020 Apr 29.
An analysis of arguments for pain eliminativism reveals two significant points of divergence between assumptions underlying biomedical research on pain and assumptions typically endorsed by eliminativist accounts. The first concerns the status of the term 'pain,' which is a description of a phenomenon, rather than an explanatory construct. The second concerns reductive explanation: pain is explained causally, in terms of mechanisms or factors that produce or determine it, rather than by identifying it with a physical structure, process or mechanism. These discrepancies undermine several arguments for pain eliminativism.
对疼痛消除主义观点的分析揭示了疼痛生物医学研究背后的假设与消除主义观点通常所认可的假设之间存在两个显著的分歧点。第一个涉及“疼痛”一词的地位,它是对一种现象的描述,而非一种解释性概念。第二个涉及还原论解释:疼痛是根据产生或决定它的机制或因素从因果关系上进行解释的,而不是通过将其等同于一种物理结构、过程或机制来解释。这些差异削弱了支持疼痛消除主义的几个观点。