Kluge E H
University of Victoria, Canada.
J Med Ethics. 1988 Dec;14(4):206-11. doi: 10.1136/jme.14.4.206.
Court-ordered caesarean sections against the explicit wishes of the pregnant woman have been criticised as violations of the woman's fundamental right to autonomy and to the inviolability of the person--particularly, so it is argued, because the fetus in utero is not yet a person. This paper examines the logic of this position and argues that once the fetus has passed a certain stage of neurological development it is a person, and that then the whole issue becomes one of balancing of rights: the right-to-life of the fetal person against the right to autonomy and inviolability of the woman; and that the fetal right usually wins.
违背孕妇明确意愿的法院强制剖腹产，被批评为侵犯了女性的基本自主权和人身不可侵犯权——特别是有人认为，因为子宫内的胎儿还不是一个人。本文审视了这一立场的逻辑，并认为一旦胎儿发育到一定的神经阶段，它就是一个人，那么整个问题就变成了权利平衡的问题：胎儿的生命权与女性的自主权和不可侵犯权之间的平衡；而且胎儿的权利通常会胜出。
