Draper H
Department of Biomedical Ethics, Medical School, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston.
J Med Ethics. 1996 Dec;22(6):327-33. doi: 10.1136/jme.22.6.327.
In the UK in October 1992, Mrs S was forced to have a caesarean section despite her objections to such a procedure on religious grounds. The case once again called into question the obligations of women to the unborn, and also whether one person can be forced to undergo a medical procedure for the benefit of someone else. Re S, like the case of Angela Carder, is often discussed in terms of the conflict between maternal and fetal rights. This paper looks instead at our obligations to save life in general-whether or not we are pregnant- and at the obligations of mothers to their children-whether they are born or unborn. Drawing on Judith Jarvis Thomson's distinction, it argues that minimal decency informs the duties which are owed to strangers, but that parents can be expected to behave as Good Samaritans towards their children. Finally, it is argued that even if mothers are ethically obliged to consent to caesarean sections which will save the lives of their babies, this does not necessarily mean that others are at liberty, or even obliged, to proceed with such operations without their consent.
1992年10月在英国，S夫人尽管基于宗教理由反对剖腹产手术，但还是被迫接受了该手术。这一案件再次引发了关于女性对未出生胎儿的义务的质疑，以及一个人是否可以为了他人的利益而被迫接受医疗手术的问题。与安吉拉·卡德案一样，“S案”常常从母婴权利冲突的角度进行讨论。本文转而探讨我们一般而言拯救生命的义务——无论我们是否怀孕，以及母亲对其子女的义务——无论子女是已出生还是未出生。借鉴朱迪思·贾维斯·汤姆森的区分观点，本文认为最低限度的体面构成了对陌生人应尽的义务，但可以期望父母像乐善好施者一样对待自己的孩子。最后，本文认为，即使母亲在伦理上有义务同意进行能挽救其婴儿生命的剖腹产手术，这也不一定意味着其他人有权甚至有义务在未经她们同意的情况下进行此类手术。
