School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin, China.
Sci Prog. 2020 Apr-Jun;103(2):36850420916329. doi: 10.1177/0036850420916329.
Considering the multiple effects of product greenness and carbon emission trading, this article constructs a differential game model to study the collaborative innovation between enterprises in a green supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one supplier. This article examines the optimal green technology innovation strategies, optimal revenues of manufacturers and suppliers as well as the overall green supply chain revenues in the Nash non-cooperative game model, the Stackelberg master-slave game model, and cooperative game model, respectively. Through the comparative analysis of equilibrium results, it is found that the optimal strategies of suppliers and manufacturers as well as the total revenue of the green supply chain in the cooperative games are better than those in the non-cooperative game scenario. Meanwhile, undertaking part of suppliers' green innovation cost by manufacturers is the Pareto optimization mechanism that increases the total revenue of the green supply chain and their respective revenues. The research results of this article provide theoretical support for green supply chain enterprises to formulate incentive mechanisms for scientific strategy-making and reasonable revenue distribution.
考虑到产品绿色度和碳排放交易的多重影响，本文构建了一个微分博弈模型，以研究由一个制造商和一个供应商组成的绿色供应链中企业之间的协同创新。本文分别在纳什非合作博弈模型、斯塔克尔伯格主从博弈模型和合作博弈模型中，考察了绿色技术创新策略、制造商和供应商的最优收益以及整个绿色供应链收益的最优情况。通过均衡结果的比较分析，发现合作博弈中供应商和制造商的最优策略以及绿色供应链的总收益均优于非合作博弈情景。同时，制造商承担部分供应商的绿色创新成本是增加绿色供应链总收益和各自收益的帕累托优化机制。本文的研究结果为绿色供应链企业制定科学的战略制定和合理的收益分配激励机制提供了理论支持。
