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供应商生态设计对供应链经济效益及相关协调的影响。

The Effect of a Supplier's Eco-Design on the Economic Benefits of a Supply Chain and Associated Coordination.

机构信息

Faculty of Business Administration, School of Business Administration, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130, China.

College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China.

出版信息

Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2021 Dec 18;18(24):13357. doi: 10.3390/ijerph182413357.

DOI:10.3390/ijerph182413357
PMID:34948968
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8702225/
Abstract

The eco-design of upstream suppliers can reduce the environmental impact from the production process for downstream customers. To analyze the effect of suppliers' eco-design on the economic benefits of up-downstream supply chain and the mechanisms, this study constructed a master-slave game theory model for a supplier and a manufacturer. Based on this game theory model, this study comparatively analyzes the effects on raw material/part prices, retail product prices, sale volume, revenue, and eco-design effort level under three conditions (no eco-design, decentralized decision-making with eco-design, centralized decision-making with eco-design). And to further analyze the effect of eco-design costs on the optimal solution, this article takes the supply chain of tire production as an example. This analysis could provide suggestions for the suppliers and manufacturers to develop and improve their eco-design. The main results are as follows: the supplier eco-design is beneficial to improving the overall economic benefits for suppliers and manufacturers under certain conditions, and the range in which a supplier is willing to implement eco-design in a decentralized decision-making situation is wider than that in a centralized decision-making situation; when a supplier implements an eco-design, it will transfer part of the cost to the manufacturer by raising the unit raw material/parts prices. Meanwhile, the manufacturer can reduce the production cost when the benefit of eco-design is more than the increased purchasing price, and they can decrease the retail price to expand the sales volume. Hence, consumers will benefit from lower prices. Thus, it is a multi-win situation among the suppliers, manufacturers, and consumers.

摘要

上游供应商的生态设计可以减少下游客户生产过程中的环境影响。为了分析供应商生态设计对上下游供应链经济效益的影响及其机制,本研究构建了供应商和制造商的主从博弈理论模型。基于该博弈理论模型,本研究比较分析了在三种情况下(无生态设计、分散决策的生态设计和集中决策的生态设计)原材料/零部件价格、零售产品价格、销售量、收入和生态设计努力水平对上下游供应链的影响。为了进一步分析生态设计成本对最优解的影响,本文以轮胎生产供应链为例进行了分析。这些分析可以为供应商和制造商提供有关开发和改进生态设计的建议。主要结果如下:在某些条件下,供应商的生态设计有利于提高供应商和制造商的整体经济效益,并且在分散决策情况下供应商愿意实施生态设计的范围比集中决策情况下更广;当供应商实施生态设计时,它会通过提高单位原材料/零部件价格将部分成本转嫁给制造商。同时,当生态设计的收益超过增加的采购价格时,制造商可以降低生产成本,降低零售价格以扩大销售量。因此,消费者将受益于更低的价格。因此,这是供应商、制造商和消费者之间的多赢局面。

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本文引用的文献

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Upstream-Downstream Joint Carbon Reduction Strategies Based on Low-Carbon Promotion.基于低碳推广的上下游联合减碳策略。
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2018 Jun 27;15(7):1351. doi: 10.3390/ijerph15071351.
2
A sustainable manufacturing system design: A fuzzy multi-objective optimization model.可持续制造系统设计:模糊多目标优化模型。
Environ Sci Pollut Res Int. 2018 Sep;25(25):24535-24547. doi: 10.1007/s11356-017-9787-6. Epub 2017 Aug 10.