Browning Heather, Veit Walter
School of Philosophy, Australian National University, Canberra 0200, Australia.
School of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Sydney, Camperdown 2006, Australia.
Animals (Basel). 2020 May 5;10(5):799. doi: 10.3390/ani10050799.
One of the biggest ethical issues in animal agriculture is that of the welfare of animals at the end of their lives, during the process of slaughter. Much work in animal welfare science is focussed on finding humane ways to transport and slaughter animals, to minimise the harm done during this process. In this paper, we take a philosophical look at what it means to perform slaughter humanely, beyond simply reducing pain and suffering during the slaughter process. In particular, we will examine the issue of the harms of deprivation inflicted in ending life prematurely, as well as shape of life concerns and the ethical implications of inflicting these harms at the end of life, without the potential for future offsetting through positive experiences. We will argue that though these considerations may mean that no slaughter is in a deep sense truly 'humane', this should not undermine the importance of further research and development to ensure that while the practice continues, animal welfare harms are minimised as far as possible.
畜牧业中最大的伦理问题之一是动物在生命末期、屠宰过程中的福利问题。动物福利科学的许多工作都集中在寻找人道的方式来运输和屠宰动物,以尽量减少这一过程中造成的伤害。在本文中,我们从哲学角度审视人道屠宰意味着什么,这不仅仅是简单地减少屠宰过程中的痛苦。特别是,我们将探讨过早结束生命所造成的剥夺伤害问题,以及生命形态问题,以及在生命末期造成这些伤害且没有通过积极经历来抵消未来影响的伦理含义。我们将论证,尽管这些考量可能意味着从深层次意义上讲,没有哪种屠宰是真正“人道的”,但这不应削弱进一步研究和开发的重要性,以确保在屠宰行为持续存在的情况下,尽可能将动物福利伤害降至最低。