Michael Michael T
Underwood International College, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea.
Front Psychol. 2020 May 21;11:984. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00984. eCollection 2020.
Unconscious emotions are of central importance to psychoanalysis. They do, however, raise conceptual problems. The most pertinent concerns the intuition, shared by Freud, that consciousness is essential to emotion, which makes the idea of unconscious emotion seem paradoxical. In this paper, I address this paradox from the perspective of the philosopher R. C. Roberts' account of emotions as concern-based construals. I provide an interpretation of this account in the context of affective neuroscience and explore the form of Freudian repression that emotions may be subject to under such an interpretation. This exploration draws on evidence from research on alexithymia and utilises ideas from free-energy neuroscience. The free-energy framework, moreover, facilitates an account of repression that avoids the homunculus objection and coheres with recent work on hysteria.
无意识情绪对精神分析至关重要。然而，它们确实引发了概念上的问题。最相关的问题涉及到弗洛伊德所认同的直觉，即意识对情绪至关重要，这使得无意识情绪的概念似乎自相矛盾。在本文中，我从哲学家R.C.罗伯茨将情绪视为基于关切的解释这一角度来探讨这一悖论。我在情感神经科学的背景下对这一解释进行阐释，并探讨在这种解释下情绪可能遭受的弗洛伊德式压抑形式。这一探索借鉴了关于述情障碍的研究证据，并运用了自由能神经科学的观点。此外，自由能框架有助于对压抑进行一种解释，这种解释避免了侏儒问题，并与最近关于癔症的研究相契合。
