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选举能否提高选区响应度?来自美国城市的证据。

Do Elections Improve Constituency Responsiveness? Evidence from US Cities.

作者信息

Christensen Darin, Ejdemyr Simon

机构信息

Departments of Public Policy and Political Science, UCLA.

Departments of Public Policy and Political Science, Facebook Inc.

出版信息

Political Sci Res Methods. 2020 Jul;8(3):459-476. doi: 10.1017/psrm.2018.46. Epub 2018 Nov 29.

DOI:10.1017/psrm.2018.46
PMID:32549985
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7299200/
Abstract

Do elections motivate incumbent politicians to serve their voters? In this paper, we use millions of service requests placed by residents in US cities to measure constituency responsiveness. We then test whether an unusual policy change in New York City, which enabled city councilors to run for three rather than two terms in office, improved constituency responsiveness in previously term-limited councilors' districts. Using difference-in-differences, we find robust evidence for this. Taking advantage of differential timing of local election races in New York City and San Francisco, we also find late-term improvements to responsiveness in districts represented by reelection-seeking incumbents. Elections improve municipal services, but also create cycles in constituency responsiveness. These findings have implications for theories of representative democracy.

摘要

选举会促使在职政治家为选民服务吗?在本文中,我们利用美国城市居民提交的数百万份服务请求来衡量选区响应度。然后,我们测试纽约市一项不同寻常的政策变化——该变化使市议员能够竞选三个任期而非两个任期——是否提高了此前有任期限制的议员所在选区的选区响应度。通过使用差分法,我们找到了有力证据支持这一点。利用纽约市和旧金山地方选举时间的差异,我们还发现寻求连任的在职议员所代表的选区在任期后期响应度有所提高。选举改善了市政服务,但也在选区响应度方面造成了周期性变化。这些发现对代议制民主理论具有启示意义。

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本文引用的文献

1
The Senate Electoral Cycle and Bicameral Appropriations Politics.参议院选举周期与两院拨款政治。
Am J Pol Sci. 2009;53(2):343-359. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00374.x.