Jeannoël Marion, Antona Denise, Lazarus Clément, Lina Bruno, Schuffenecker Isabelle
Centre National de Référence des Entérovirus et Parechovirus, WHO National Poliovirus Laboratory, Institut des Agents Infectieux, Groupement Hospitalier Nord, Hospices Civils de Lyon, 69317 Lyon, France.
Santé publique France, 94410 Saint Maurice, France.
Vaccines (Basel). 2020 Jun 22;8(2):331. doi: 10.3390/vaccines8020331.
The safe and secure containment of infectious poliovirus (PV) in facilities where live PV are handled is the condition to achieve and maintain poliomyelitis eradication. Despite precautions to minimize the risk of release of PV from such facilities to the environment, breaches of containment have already been documented. Here, we report the management of an incident that occurred on 30 November 2018 in a French vaccine manufacturing plant. Five adequately vaccinated operators were exposed to a Sabin poliovirus type 3 (PV3) spill. A microbiological risk assessment was conducted and the operators were monitored for PV shedding. On day 5 after exposure, Sabin PV3 was detected only in the stool sample of the most exposed worker. Shedding of Sabin PV3 (as detected by viral culture) was restricted to a very short period (less than 15 days). Monitoring of this incident was an opportunity to assess the relevance of our national response plan. We concluded that the measures undertaken and reported here were appropriate and proportional.
在处理活的脊髓灰质炎病毒（PV）的设施中安全可靠地遏制传染性PV，是实现和维持根除脊髓灰质炎的条件。尽管已采取预防措施将PV从此类设施释放到环境中的风险降至最低，但已记录到有 containment 被突破的情况。在此，我们报告2018年11月30日发生在一家法国疫苗生产厂的一起事件的处理情况。五名接种过充分疫苗的操作人员暴露于一株脊髓灰质炎病毒3型（PV3）Sabin株的泄漏事件。进行了微生物风险评估，并对操作人员进行PV排泄监测。暴露后第5天，仅在暴露程度最高的工人的粪便样本中检测到Sabin PV3。Sabin PV3的排泄（通过病毒培养检测）仅限于非常短的时期（不到15天）。对该事件的监测是评估我们国家应对计划相关性的一个契机。我们得出结论，此处采取和报告的措施是适当且成比例的。
