Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Lowell, Lowell, Massachusetts, USA
Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C, USA.
J Med Ethics. 2021 Nov;47(11):748-755. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2019-105732. Epub 2020 Jul 27.
In this paper, we highlight some problems for accounts of disability and enhancement that have not been sufficiently addressed in the literature. The reason, we contend, is that contemporary debates that seek to define, characterise or explain the normative valence of disability and enhancement do not pay sufficient attention to (1) a wide range of cases, and (2) the transition between one state and another. In section one, we provide seven cases that might count as disability or enhancement. We explain why (with the exception of the first two, which lay the groundwork for the others) each case might count, and on what basis, and why it is been neglected. Each case is explained as a transition in what we call capacity space. We then argue that no definition of disability or enhancement addresses all of these cases, except for strict welfarist accounts of disability that do not rely on a depiction of any particular capacity. We argue further, however, that this is a serious deficiency of welfarist conceptions of disability. We then address objections to our account.
在本文中，我们强调了一些残疾和增强相关理论尚未充分解决的问题。我们认为，当代旨在定义、刻画或解释残疾和增强的规范性价值的争论，没有充分关注（1）广泛的案例，以及（2）状态之间的转变。在第一节中，我们提供了七个可能被视为残疾或增强的案例。我们解释了为什么（除了前两个案例为其他案例奠定基础外）每个案例都可能被视为残疾或增强，以及依据是什么，以及为什么它们被忽视了。每个案例都被解释为我们所谓的能力空间中的一种转变。然后我们认为，除了不依赖于任何特定能力描述的严格福利主义残疾概念之外，没有任何残疾或增强的定义可以涵盖所有这些案例。然而，我们进一步认为，这是福利主义残疾概念的一个严重缺陷。然后，我们将解决对我们的观点的反对意见。
