Savulescu Julian, Kahane Guy
Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford , Littlegate House, St Ebbes Street, Oxford OX1 1PT , UK.
Clin Ethics. 2011 Mar;6(1):45-51. doi: 10.1258/ce.2011.011010.
In this paper, we offer a new account of disability. According to our account, some state of a person's biology or psychology is a disability if that state makes it more likely that a person's life will get worse, in terms of his or her own wellbeing, in a given set of social and environmental circumstances. Unlike the medical model of disability, our welfarist approach does not tie disability to deviation from normal species' functioning, nor does it understand disability in essentialist terms. Like the social model of disability, the welfarist approach sees disability as a harmful state that results from the interaction between a person's biology and psychology and his or her surrounding environment. However, unlike the social model, it denies that the harm associated with disability is entirely due to social prejudice or injustice. In this paper, we outline and clarify the welfarist approach, answer common objections and illustrate its usefulness in addressing a range of difficult ethical questions involving disability.
在本文中，我们提出了一种关于残疾的新观点。根据我们的观点，如果一个人的生理或心理状态在特定的社会和环境条件下，就其自身福祉而言，使其生活更有可能变差，那么这种状态就是一种残疾。与残疾的医学模式不同，我们的福利主义方法并不将残疾与偏离正常物种功能联系起来，也不是从本质主义角度来理解残疾。与残疾的社会模式一样，福利主义方法将残疾视为一种有害状态，这种状态是由一个人的生理和心理与其周围环境之间的相互作用所导致的。然而，与社会模式不同的是，它否认与残疾相关的伤害完全是由于社会偏见或不公正造成的。在本文中，我们概述并阐明了福利主义方法，回答了常见的反对意见，并说明了它在解决一系列涉及残疾的棘手伦理问题中的作用。
