School of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, Iran.
Waste Manag. 2020 Sep;115:121-135. doi: 10.1016/j.wasman.2020.07.019. Epub 2020 Jul 29.
Due to the growing concerns about the increasing release of consumer products to the environment, especially for defective electronic products, the management of the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) is emerging. To do this, a chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector is offered in a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game. Due to the presenting of some concepts in the model, which are provided by considering two categories of customers for primary and secondary goods, it is suitable for electronics supply chains. In order to coordinate between the members of the chain, a hierarchical revenue sharing (HRS) contract is introduced, which is suitable for some members of the chain where operate as a holding company. In the following, some numerical examples are applied to examine the applicability of the proposed models. The results of the sensitivity analysis on the main parameters of the problem indicate an increase in the profitability of all members in the coordination contract compared to the decentralized mode. Furthermore, customer sensitivity to price and quality has also inverse and direct impact to members' profitability, respectively. Each of the analyzes provides some in-depth managerial implications that can be considered for future research. Finally, another research result will explain the increase in the amount of return defective goods by the customer in the contract mode.
由于人们越来越关注消费品不断释放到环境中，特别是有缺陷的电子产品，闭环供应链（CLSC）的管理正在兴起。为此，在制造商主导的Stackelberg 博弈中提供了一个由制造商、零售商和回收商组成的链条。由于模型中提出了一些概念，这些概念是通过考虑两类客户（主要和次要商品）来提供的，因此它适用于电子产品供应链。为了在链成员之间进行协调，引入了分层收益共享（HRS）合同，该合同适用于一些作为控股公司运营的链成员。接下来，应用了一些数值示例来检验所提出模型的适用性。对问题主要参数的敏感性分析结果表明，与分散模式相比，协调合同使所有成员的盈利能力都有所提高。此外，客户对价格和质量的敏感性分别对成员的盈利能力产生了反向和直接的影响。每项分析都提供了一些深入的管理意义，可以考虑用于未来的研究。最后，另一个研究结果将解释在合同模式下客户退回缺陷品数量的增加。
